Bluetooth - Revision history

Tom: /* References */

2025-01-03T00:35:06Z

‎References

Tom: /* Some Solutions */

2025-01-03T00:19:13Z

‎Some Solutions

Tom: /* Beacons */

2023-12-06T22:51:08Z

‎Beacons

Tom: /* Problems */

2023-12-06T22:22:21Z

‎Problems

Tom: /* Problems */

2023-12-06T22:19:36Z

‎Problems

Tom: /* Some Solutions */

2023-08-08T22:43:35Z

‎Some Solutions

Tom: /* Some Solutions */

2023-08-06T23:59:15Z

‎Some Solutions

Tom: /* Low Energy */

2023-07-28T04:09:21Z

‎Low Energy

Tom: /* Host Controller Interface (HCI) */

2023-07-28T03:44:25Z

‎Host Controller Interface (HCI)

Tom: /* Security */

2023-07-26T20:56:50Z

‎Security

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:35, 3 January 2025
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	[[Category: Glossary]]		[[Category: Glossary]]
	[[Category: Standard]]		[[Category: Standard]]
		+	[[Category: Networking]]

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 ==Some Solutions==
-* [https://github.com/WICG/serial/blob/main/EXPLAINER_BLUETOOTH.md Web Serial support for Bluetooth RFCOMM services Explainer]<blockquote>Although most current development activity on Bluetooth technology focuses on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and mesh, active development still exists on Bluetooth BR/EDR (AKA "classic"). The Bluetooth classic Serial Port Profile (SPP) remains a popular profile, has support from currently shipping hardware, and at present has no suitable replacement in BLE. SPP is implemented using the lower-level Radio Frequency Communication (RFCOMM) protocol designed to emulate RS-232 serial ports. New hardware is still being introduced with performance characteristics that need the latency & bandwidth of SPP and RFCOMM. We can address this need by exposing serial connections via the Web Serial API.</blockquote>
+* [https://github.com/WICG/serial/blob/main/EXPLAINER_BLUETOOTH.md Web Serial support for Bluetooth RFCOMM services Explainer]<blockquote>Although most current development activity on Bluetooth technology focuses on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and mesh, active development still exists on Bluetooth BR/EDR (AKA "classic"). The Bluetooth classic Serial Port Profile (SPP) remains a popular profile, has support from currently shipping hardware, and at present has no suitable replacement in BLE. SPP is implemented using the lower-level Radio Frequency Communication (RFCOMM) protocol designed to emulate [[RS-232]] serial ports. New hardware is still being introduced with performance characteristics that need the latency & bandwidth of SPP and RFCOMM. We can address this need by exposing serial connections via the Web Serial API.</blockquote>
 * [https://github.com/shinyorg/samples Shiny.BluetoothLE and other comms packages for .NET] achived & inactive on 2023-06-22
 * [https://openid.bitbucket.io/connect/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-over-ble-1_0.html#name-qr-code OpenID for Verifiable Presentations over BLE - draft 00] This document defines how Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can be used to request the presentation of verifiable credentials. It uses the request and response syntax as defined in [OpenID4VP].

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 * [https://www.theregister.com/2023/12/06/bluetooth_bug_apple_linux/?utm_source=dlvr.it Apple and some Linux distros are open to Bluetooth attack] Issue has been around since at least 2012. The bug, tracked as CVE-2023-45866, doesn't require any special hardware to exploit. (2023-12-06)
 ===Beacons===
-While beacons using [[Bluetooth]] was introduced to solve a problem, but in just substituted one problem for another. This attack was published in late 2021:<ref>Michelle Hampson ''Widespread Vulnerability Identified in Phones and Bluetooth Devices'' (2021-11-04) IEEE Spectrum https://spectrum.ieee.org/bluetooth-security</ref><blockquote>Bluetooth hardware contains a security flaw that may compromise about 40% of mobile devices, according to University of California, San Diego (UCSD) researchers. The hardware underlies the operation of phone-tracking applications, which UCSD's Nishant Bhaskar said "require frequent and constant transmission of Bluetooth beacons to be detected by nearby devices. Unfortunately, this also means that an adversary can also find out where we are at all times by simply listening to the Bluetooth transmissions from our personal devices." Defects or imperfections during manufacture can slightly distort Bluetooth signals from individual devices, resulting in the generation of a unique signature. Experiments showed approximately 40% of mobile devices could be identified individually within crowds based on their Bluetooth signal signatures. </blockquote>
+While beacons using [[Bluetooth]] was introduced to solve a problem, but it just substituted one problem for another. This attack was published in late 2021:<ref>Michelle Hampson ''Widespread Vulnerability Identified in Phones and Bluetooth Devices'' (2021-11-04) IEEE Spectrum https://spectrum.ieee.org/bluetooth-security</ref><blockquote>Bluetooth hardware contains a security flaw that may compromise about 40% of mobile devices, according to University of California, San Diego (UCSD) researchers. The hardware underlies the operation of phone-tracking applications, which UCSD's Nishant Bhaskar said "require frequent and constant transmission of Bluetooth beacons to be detected by nearby devices. Unfortunately, this also means that an adversary can also find out where we are at all times by simply listening to the Bluetooth transmissions from our personal devices." Defects or imperfections during manufacture can slightly distort Bluetooth signals from individual devices, resulting in the generation of a unique signature. Experiments showed approximately 40% of mobile devices could be identified individually within crowds based on their Bluetooth signal signatures. </blockquote>
 ==Some Solutions==

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 * Security was not designed into the protocol at the beginning.
 ===Attacks===
-* [https://www.theregister.com/2023/12/06/bluetooth_bug_apple_linux/?utm_source=dlvr.it Apple and some Linux distros are open to Bluetooth attack] Issue has been around since at least 2012 (2023-12-06)
+* [https://www.theregister.com/2023/12/06/bluetooth_bug_apple_linux/?utm_source=dlvr.it Apple and some Linux distros are open to Bluetooth attack] Issue has been around since at least 2012. The bug, tracked as CVE-2023-45866, doesn't require any special hardware to exploit. (2023-12-06)
 ===Beacons===
 While beacons using [[Bluetooth]] was introduced to solve a problem, but in just substituted one problem for another. This attack was published in late 2021:<ref>Michelle Hampson ''Widespread Vulnerability Identified in Phones and Bluetooth Devices'' (2021-11-04) IEEE Spectrum https://spectrum.ieee.org/bluetooth-security</ref><blockquote>Bluetooth hardware contains a security flaw that may compromise about 40% of mobile devices, according to University of California, San Diego (UCSD) researchers. The hardware underlies the operation of phone-tracking applications, which UCSD's Nishant Bhaskar said "require frequent and constant transmission of Bluetooth beacons to be detected by nearby devices. Unfortunately, this also means that an adversary can also find out where we are at all times by simply listening to the Bluetooth transmissions from our personal devices." Defects or imperfections during manufacture can slightly distort Bluetooth signals from individual devices, resulting in the generation of a unique signature. Experiments showed approximately 40% of mobile devices could be identified individually within crowds based on their Bluetooth signal signatures. </blockquote>

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 ==Problems==
 * Security was not designed into the protocol at the beginning.
 ===Beacons===
 While beacons using [[Bluetooth]] was introduced to solve a problem, but in just substituted one problem for another. This attack was published in late 2021:<ref>Michelle Hampson ''Widespread Vulnerability Identified in Phones and Bluetooth Devices'' (2021-11-04) IEEE Spectrum https://spectrum.ieee.org/bluetooth-security</ref><blockquote>Bluetooth hardware contains a security flaw that may compromise about 40% of mobile devices, according to University of California, San Diego (UCSD) researchers. The hardware underlies the operation of phone-tracking applications, which UCSD's Nishant Bhaskar said "require frequent and constant transmission of Bluetooth beacons to be detected by nearby devices. Unfortunately, this also means that an adversary can also find out where we are at all times by simply listening to the Bluetooth transmissions from our personal devices." Defects or imperfections during manufacture can slightly distort Bluetooth signals from individual devices, resulting in the generation of a unique signature. Experiments showed approximately 40% of mobile devices could be identified individually within crowds based on their Bluetooth signal signatures. </blockquote>

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 ===Low Energy===
-BLE or Bluetooth Low Energy.<ref>IoT Security Using BLE Encryption https://www.networkcomputing.com/wireless-infrastructure/iot-security-using-ble-encryption</ref>
+BLE or Bluetooth Low Energy.<ref>IoT Security Using BLE Encryption https://www.networkcomputing.com/wireless-infrastructure/iot-security-using-ble-encryption</ref><ref>TI, ''Bluetooth'' https://software-dl.ti.com/lprf/simplelink_cc2640r2_latest/docs/blestack/ble_user_guide/html/ble-stack-3.x/overview.html?highlight=bluetooth%20link%20key#null</ref>
   Also excited by a stationary antenna that causes the smartphone to respond
-  Needs to have an app on a smartphone that is powered up and has bluetooth enabled that responds to the message with a UUID
+  Needs to have an app on a smartphone that is powered up and has Bluetooth enabled that responds to the message with a UUID
   Operations at 2.4 GHz at about 70 meters between device and antenna.

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 ===Host Controller Interface (HCI)===
 The host controller interface (HCI) layer is a thin layer which transports commands and events between the host and controller elements of the Bluetooth protocol stack. In a pure network processor application (that is, the host_test project), the HCI layer is implemented through a transport protocol such as SPI or UART.<ref>TI ''Host Controller Interface (HCI)'' https://software-dl.ti.com/lprf/simplelink_cc2640r2_latest/docs/blestack/ble_user_guide/html/ble-stack-3.x/hci.html</ref>
 ===Security===