Capability - Revision history

Tom: /* Problems */

2026-01-08T01:29:11Z

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2025-11-03T01:23:31Z

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2025-11-03T01:23:02Z

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Tom: /* Network Access Capability */

2025-10-24T22:08:54Z

‎Network Access Capability

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2025-10-24T01:46:53Z

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Tom at 01:34, 24 October 2025

2025-10-24T01:34:44Z

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2025-10-06T23:22:34Z

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2022-06-06T02:28:32Z

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Tom: Created page with "==Full Title or Meme== Capability refers to the set of valuable functionings that a person has effective access to. Thus, r person's capability represents the effective freed..."

2022-06-06T01:16:04Z

Created page with "==Full Title or Meme== Capability refers to the set of valuable functionings that a person has effective access to. Thus, r person's capability represents the effective freed..."

New page

==Full Title or Meme==

Capability refers to the set of valuable functionings that a person has effective access to. Thus, r person's capability represents the effective freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that she has reason to value.

==References==

[[Category: Glossary]]

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 Steve Lipner on capabilities. Since the basic assumption of a capability system is that access to data is granted by access to the capability, and that capabilities can be "passed" from user to user, process to process, they are a nightmare from the perspective of covert channels. You really have to perform heroic unnatural acts to defeat covert channels in a capability system. The use of a capability model seems to simplify some formal verification, so a lot of systems tried to implement or simulate them, but it always seemed to me like adding extra complexity and mechanism if you were worried about covert channels.
+I asked because the capability genie is trying to get out of the bottle again.  This helps my attempt to keep the cork in the bottle.
 Steve Lipner sent the following messages at 1:12 PM

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 Think of it like a cryptographic key: if you hold it, you can open the lock.
-* [https://gluufederation.medium.com/entitlements-to-capabilities-744117a710c9 Entitlements to Capabilities] Mike Swartz 2025-10-03
+* [https://gluufederation.medium.com/entitlements-to-capabilities-744117a710c9 Entitlements to Capabilities] Mike Schwartz 2025-10-03
 ==Problems==

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 * Possession of the capability itself is sufficient proof of access — no further lookup in a central permissions table is required.
-Think of it like a **cryptographic key**: if you hold it, you can open the lock.
+Think of it like a cryptographic key: if you hold it, you can open the lock.
 ==Problems==
 Steve Lipner on capabilities. Since the basic assumption of a capability system is that access to data is granted by access to the capability, and that capabilities can be "passed" from user to user, process to process, they are a nightmare from the perspective of covert channels. You really have to perform heroic unnatural acts to defeat covert channels in a capability system. The use of a capability model seems to simplify some formal verification, so a lot of systems tried to implement or simulate them, but it always seemed to me like adding extra complexity and mechanism if you were worried about covert channels.

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 ==Network Access Capability==
-*Eleanor Hayes Meritt
+*Eleanor Hayes Meritt Technology Executive | Identity & Access Management, Technology Executive | Identity & Access Management
 Why Most AI Security Discussions Miss the Point

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 ==Full Title or Meme==
-Capability refers to the set of valuable functions that a [[Entity]] can effectively bring to bear on a problem. A person's capability represents the effective freedom of an [[Entity]] to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that she has reason to evaluate and decide.
+[[Capability]] refers to the set of valuable functions that a [[Entity]] can effectively bring to bear on a problem. A person's capability represents the effective freedom of an [[Entity]] to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that she has reason to evaluate and decide.
-- A **capability** is an **unforgeable token of authority**.
+Think of it like a **cryptographic key**: if you hold it, you can open the lock.
-- It simultaneously **designates a resource** (what you want to access) and **authorizes the rights** (what you can do with it).
+==Problems==
-- Possession of the capability itself is sufficient proof of access — no further lookup in a central permissions table is required.
+Steve Lipner on capabilities. Since the basic assumption of a capability system is that access to data is granted by access to the capability, and that capabilities can be "passed" from user to user, process to process, they are a nightmare from the perspective of covert channels. You really have to perform heroic unnatural acts to defeat covert channels in a capability system. The use of a capability model seems to simplify some formal verification, so a lot of systems tried to implement or simulate them, but it always seemed to me like adding extra complexity and mechanism if you were worried about covert channels.
-Think of it like a **cryptographic key**: if you hold it, you can open the lock.
 ==Local Access Capability==

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 Think of it like a **cryptographic key**: if you hold it, you can open the lock.
-==Access capability model==
+==Local Access Capability==
 one of the most important alternatives to traditional access control lists (ACLs) in computer security and governance.
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 An **access capability model** replaces identity‑based permission checks with **token‑based authority**. It’s elegant because it collapses *designation* (what resource) and *authorization* (what rights) into a single, unforgeable object.
-**Sources:** Wikipedia on capability‑based security; Storj developer docs on capability‑based access.
+*references Wikipedia on capability‑based security; Storj developer docs on capability‑based access.
-==Eleanor Hayes Meritt==
+===CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions)===
 Technology Executive | Identity & Access ManagementTechnology Executive | Identity & Access Management
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 To ensure responsible AI assistants, the reliance on full OAuth tokens must diminish. OCap embodies the concept of least authority by design. Meanwhile, macaroons and biscuits exemplify practical solutions: portable, verifiable tokens allowing for delegation and constraint. However, both lack an efficient revocation method, necessitating additional infrastructure.
 In the realm of securing AI agent delegation, would you lean towards macaroons for their simplicity and lightweight nature, or do biscuits appeal to you for their flexibility and compatibility across federated systems? Would love to know what you are thinking.