ECDSA - Revision history

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2025-04-21T00:50:46Z

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Tom at 01:21, 11 November 2024

2024-11-11T01:21:10Z

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2024-11-11T01:18:55Z

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Tom: Created page with "==Full Title== Eliptic Curea with DSA ==Context== One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produc..."

2024-11-11T01:17:13Z

Created page with "==Full Title== Eliptic Curea with DSA ==Context== One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produc..."

New page

==Full Title==
Eliptic Curea with DSA

==Context==
One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key [1,2].

* [https://asecuritysite.com/sage/sage_ecdsa_crack_fault Here is the Sage code for this]

[1] Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250).
[2] Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.

==References==

[[Category: Cryptography]]

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 * [https://asecuritysite.com/sage/sage_ecdsa_crack_fault Here is the Sage code for this]
 ==References==
 [[Category: Cryptography]]

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 ==Context==
-One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key [1,2].
+One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key.<ref>Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250)</ref><ref>Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.</ref>
 * [https://asecuritysite.com/sage/sage_ecdsa_crack_fault Here is the Sage code for this]
 ==References==
 [[Category: Cryptography]]

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-[1] Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250).
+ [1] Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250).
-[2] Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.
+ [2] Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.
 ==References==
 [[Category: Cryptography]]

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 ==Full Title==
-Eliptic Curea with DSA
+Elliptic Curves with DSA
 ==Context==