QR Code - Revision history

Tom: /* Mastercard */

2024-08-22T19:41:13Z

‎Mastercard

Tom: /* References */

2024-08-22T19:18:12Z

‎References

Tom at 20:03, 29 February 2024

2024-02-29T20:03:28Z

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2024-02-29T19:57:58Z

‎Problems

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2024-02-16T21:46:07Z

‎Problems

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2024-01-16T02:42:20Z

‎Problems

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2023-03-22T17:42:11Z

‎Problems

Tom: /* Problems */

2023-03-22T17:39:58Z

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@@ Line 15: / Line 15: @@
 ==Mastercard==
-POS
+[[Point of Sale]] QR presentation from the Merchant ([[Veryifier]]) in lieu of the physical card.
 The diagram below shows how Mastercard MPQR (Merchant Presented QR) works. There is 𝐧𝐨 𝐏𝐨𝐒 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐨𝐫 𝐩𝐡𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐜𝐚𝐫𝐝 involved.
-🔹 Step 1: The merchant presents its QR code at checkout.
+* Step 1: The merchant presents its QR code at checkout.
 There are 𝐭𝐰𝐨 𝐭𝐲𝐩𝐞𝐬 of QR codes:
 - 𝐃𝐲𝐧𝐚𝐦𝐢𝐜: the code is generated for each transaction and includes the payment amount
 - 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐜: the code is used for all transactions
+* Step 2: The customer scans the QR code using a mobile app and confirms the payment.
-🔹 Step 2: The customer scans the QR code using a mobile app and confirms the payment.
+* Step 3: The payment app sends transaction data to the transaction originator to initiate MPQR payment.
+* Step 4: The transaction originator debits the customer’s account in the customer’s bank.
-🔹 Step 3: The payment app sends transaction data to the transaction originator to initiate MPQR payment.
+* Steps 5 and 6: The transaction originator sends a payment request to the Mastercard network. Mastercard routes the payment request to the merchant’s bank.
+* Steps 7 and 8: The merchant’s bank approves or declines the request. If it is approved, the merchant’s bank credits the merchant’s account.
-🔹 Step 4: The transaction originator debits the customer’s account in the customer’s bank.
+* Steps 9 - 11: The payment response is sent back all the way to the mobile app.
+[[File:QR mastercard.jpg]]
 ==References==

@@ Line 13: / Line 13: @@
 * [https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/12/22879728/phishing-scam-parking-meter-qr-code-austin-san-antonio A 2022-01-22 phishing scam to watch out for: fraudulent QR codes on parking meters]
 * See other attacks on the wiki page [[Wallet#QR Codes]] and the wiki page [[Quishing]].
 ==References==

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ==Full Title or Meme==
-A [[QR Code]] is just a specific two dimensal extension of a bar code.
+A [[QR Code]] is just a specific two dimensional extension of a bar code.
 ==Context==
@@ Line 10: / Line 10: @@
 * [https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidbirch/2024/02/28/the-ftc-is-concerned-about-qr-codes-and-so-should-you-be The FTC Is Concerned About QR Codes] 2024-02-28 for example car parks with a payment QR code are being pasted over with scam sites that will be happy to take your money.
 * [https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/qr-code-security-threats-begin-to-grow-as-digital-barcode-popularity-rises/ QR Code Scams Grow as Digital Barcode Popularity Rises] 2024-01-03
-* A report by Vint Cerf<ref>Vint Cert ''On QR Codes and Saftey''  '''CACM 66''' No. 2 p. 7 (2022-02)</ref> shows a common disconnect between the holder of the [[Smartphone]] that processes the app, the site where the holder is and the owner of the website where the holder enters private information. The necessity for informed consent by the holder is a strong binding between the site getting the data with the transaction that the user is asked to complete. It is in restaurants where this is a common occurrence for the restaurant to contract with a [[Third Party]] service provider, who will be the data collector for the transaction.
+* A report by Vint Cerf<ref>Vint Cert ''On QR Codes and Safety''  '''CACM 66''' No. 2 p. 7 (2022-02)</ref> shows a common disconnect between the holder of the [[Smartphone]] that processes the app, the site where the holder is and the owner of the website where the holder enters private information. The necessity for informed consent by the holder is a strong binding between the site getting the data with the transaction that the user is asked to complete. It is in restaurants where this is a common occurrence for the restaurant to contract with a [[Third Party]] service provider, who will be the data collector for the transaction.
 * [https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/12/22879728/phishing-scam-parking-meter-qr-code-austin-san-antonio A 2022-01-22 phishing scam to watch out for: fraudulent QR codes on parking meters]
 * See other attacks on the wiki page [[Wallet#QR Codes]] and the wiki page [[Quishing]].

@@ Line 8: / Line 8: @@
 ==Problems==
 * [https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/qr-code-security-threats-begin-to-grow-as-digital-barcode-popularity-rises/ QR Code Scams Grow as Digital Barcode Popularity Rises] 2024-01-03
 * A report by Vint Cerf<ref>Vint Cert ''On QR Codes and Saftey''  '''CACM 66''' No. 2 p. 7 (2022-02)</ref> shows a common disconnect between the holder of the [[Smartphone]] that processes the app, the site where the holder is and the owner of the website where the holder enters private information. The necessity for informed consent by the holder is a strong binding between the site getting the data with the transaction that the user is asked to complete. It is in restaurants where this is a common occurrence for the restaurant to contract with a [[Third Party]] service provider, who will be the data collector for the transaction.

@@ Line 8: / Line 8: @@
 ==Problems==
 * A report by Vint Cerf<ref>Vint Cert ''On QR Codes and Saftey''  '''CACM 66''' No. 2 p. 7 (2022-02)</ref> shows a common disconnect between the holder of the [[Smartphone]] that processes the app, the site where the holder is and the owner of the website where the holder enters private information. The necessity for informed consent by the holder is a strong binding between the site getting the data with the transaction that the user is asked to complete. It is in restaurants where this is a common occurrence for the restaurant to contract with a [[Third Party]] service provider, who will be the data collector for the transaction.
 * [https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/12/22879728/phishing-scam-parking-meter-qr-code-austin-san-antonio A 2022-01-22 phishing scam to watch out for: fraudulent QR codes on parking meters]

@@ Line 8: / Line 8: @@
 ==Problems==
-* [https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/12/22879728/phishing-scam-parking-meter-qr-code-austin-san-antonio The latest phishing scam to watch out for: fraudulent QR codes on parking meters]
+* A report by Vint Cerf<ref>Vint Cert ''On QR Codes and Saftey''  '''CACM 66''' No. 2  (2022-02)</ref>
 * See other attacks on the wiki page [[Wallet#QR Codes]].