Quantum Computing Threat - Revision history

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2025-05-23T22:37:30Z

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2025-04-12T00:05:59Z

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2025-04-04T05:30:39Z

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2025-04-04T05:19:50Z

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2025-04-02T20:07:22Z

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2025-04-02T20:06:42Z

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2024-09-04T21:32:36Z

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 ===Post Quantum Cryptography===
 This section details current efforts to address the threat to existing computing and networking infrastructures with most recent at the top of the list.
 * 2025-04 [https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/no-excuses-openssl-enters-the-quantum-age-ad29af287273 No Excuses: OpenSSL Enters the Quantum Age Meet ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)]
 * 2025-04 [https://asecuritysite.com/bouncy/bc_ml_dsa ML-DSA (FIPS 204) using Bouncy Castle and C#]

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 ===Post Quantum Status===
 * 2024-06 [https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ] 2024-06
 * [https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2024 The state of the post-quantum Internet] The state as determined by CloudFlare on 2024-03-05 basically says that we need to have PQC deployed by EOY 24 for TLS and code-signing, which means that the first users can be expected on the date to find support from the services.
 * [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers/ Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers] IETF 2023-08-30 draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers-00

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 ===Post Quantum Status===
-* [https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ] 2024-06
+* 2024-06 [https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ] 2024-06
 * [https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2024 The state of the post-quantum Internet] The state as determined by CloudFlare on 2024-03-05 basically says that we need to have PQC deployed by EOY 24 for TLS and code-signing, which means that the first users can be expected on the date to find support from the services.
 * [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers/ Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers] IETF 2023-08-30 draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers-00

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ===Post Quantum Cryptography===
 This section details current efforts to address the threat to existing computing and networking infrastructures with most recent at the top of the list.
-* 2025-04 https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/no-excuses-openssl-enters-the-quantum-age-ad29af287273 No Excuses: OpenSSL Enters the Quantum Age Meet ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)]
+* 2025-04 [https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/no-excuses-openssl-enters-the-quantum-age-ad29af287273 No Excuses: OpenSSL Enters the Quantum Age Meet ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)]
 * 2025-04 [https://asecuritysite.com/bouncy/bc_ml_dsa ML-DSA (FIPS 204) using Bouncy Castle and C#]
 * 2024-05 Some of the post quantum data fields are very much longer than was the case for RSA and EC. See the wiki page on [[TLS]] for the issues that still need to be addressed there.

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ===Post Quantum Cryptography===
 This section details current efforts to address the threat to existing computing and networking infrastructures with most recent at the top of the list.
 * 2025-04 [https://asecuritysite.com/bouncy/bc_ml_dsa ML-DSA (FIPS 204) using Bouncy Castle and C#]
 * 2024-05 Some of the post quantum data fields are very much longer than was the case for RSA and EC. See the wiki page on [[TLS]] for the issues that still need to be addressed there.

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 * Past transitions from one crypto framework to another have been ad hoc and uncovered challenges caused by a lack of foresight into the challenges.<ref>David Ott, +2, ''Where is the Research on Cryptographic Transition and Agility?'' '''CACM 66''' No 4 pp 29ff. (2023-04)</ref> Many deployments using cryptography have been optimized with different layers of the deployment handling different parts of the workload. As is usual with such optimizations, agility is severely reduced. It is unclear where such framework could or should be designed, academia has not considered agility an interesting problem. The US government is not engaged in creating a network of cloud providers might be willing to create some sort of framework that would address their issue. Industry tends to let the smaller players provider cryptographic solutions which are not optimized for their users.<blockquote>...there is a glaring gap in the mix: our cryptography does not come with frameworks that prepare us for and facilitate transition. Without comprehensive frameworks, this manual effort to make a transition becomes an overwhelming challenge, and one that tens of thousands of organizations worldwide, even with security savvy operations teams, struggle to put into practice.</blockquote>
 * [https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards] 2024-08-13
 * [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7535/text H.R.7535 - Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act] (2022-12-21) requires OMB to get plans in place one year after NIST creates a new set of standards.