Real Name - Revision history

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2025-05-22T17:33:43Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2025-05-22T17:32:49Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2025-05-22T17:31:32Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Full Title or Name */

2025-05-22T17:29:22Z

‎Full Title or Name

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2025-05-22T17:27:13Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2025-05-22T17:26:34Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2024-05-02T04:21:43Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2024-05-02T04:18:41Z

‎Philosophy

Tom: /* Philosophy */

2024-05-02T02:02:25Z

‎Philosophy

Tom at 02:00, 2 May 2024

2024-05-02T02:00:00Z

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 In his article on "Proper Names", John R. Searle argues that the sense of a name applies to proper names. He presents the following examples:
-  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true (even though the person's [[Real Name]] or full legal name was Marcus Tullius Cicero.)
+  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true (even though the person's [[Real Name]] or full [[Legal Name]] was Marcus Tullius Cicero.)
   (b) Is “Tully = Cicero” synthetic? If so, then each name must have a different sense.
 Initially, the idea that proper names have senses seems implausible. After all, we don’t typically provide definitions for proper names as we do for predicates. Searle suggests that both (a) and (b) are analytically true. The linguistic rules governing the use of “Cicero” and “Tully” establish that both names refer to the same identical object. Thus, the truth of their identity can be determined solely by these rules.<ref>John R. Searle, ''Proper Names'' (1958) https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108</ref>

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 In his article on "Proper Names", John R. Searle argues that the sense of a name applies to proper names. He presents the following examples:
-  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true, even though the person's [[Real Name]] or full legal name was Marcus Tullius Cicero.
+  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true (even though the person's [[Real Name]] or full legal name was Marcus Tullius Cicero.)
   (b) Is “Tully = Cicero” synthetic? If so, then each name must have a different sense.
 Initially, the idea that proper names have senses seems implausible. After all, we don’t typically provide definitions for proper names as we do for predicates. Searle suggests that both (a) and (b) are analytically true. The linguistic rules governing the use of “Cicero” and “Tully” establish that both names refer to the same identical object. Thus, the truth of their identity can be determined solely by these rules.<ref>John R. Searle, ''Proper Names'' (1958) https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108</ref>

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 In his article on "Proper Names", John R. Searle argues that the sense of a name applies to proper names. He presents the following examples:
-  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true, a [[Real Name]].
+  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true, even though the person's [[Real Name]] or full legal name was Marcus Tullius Cicero.
   (b) Is “Tully = Cicero” synthetic? If so, then each name must have a different sense.
 Initially, the idea that proper names have senses seems implausible. After all, we don’t typically provide definitions for proper names as we do for predicates. Searle suggests that both (a) and (b) are analytically true. The linguistic rules governing the use of “Cicero” and “Tully” establish that both names refer to the same identical object. Thus, the truth of their identity can be determined solely by these rules.<ref>John R. Searle, ''Proper Names'' (1958) https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108</ref>

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ==Full Title or Name==
-This is a formal definition of a '''Common Name''', or that name that is recognized by the world around us, either common law or by legislation or other authority.
+This is a formal definition of a '''Common Name''' for a [[Natural Person]], or that name that is recognized by the world around us, either common law or by legislation or other authority.
 ==Context==

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 In his article on "Proper Names", John R. Searle argues that the sense of a name applies to proper names. He presents the following examples:
-  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true a [[Real Name]].
+  (a) “Tully = Tully” is analytically true, a [[Real Name]].
   (b) Is “Tully = Cicero” synthetic? If so, then each name must have a different sense.
 Initially, the idea that proper names have senses seems implausible. After all, we don’t typically provide definitions for proper names as we do for predicates. Searle suggests that both (a) and (b) are analytically true. The linguistic rules governing the use of “Cicero” and “Tully” establish that both names refer to the same identical object. Thus, the truth of their identity can be determined solely by these rules.<ref>John R. Searle, ''Proper Names'' (1958) https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108</ref>

@@ Line 8: / Line 8: @@
 ==Philosophy==
-However, as Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity, a name does not secure its reference via any process of description fitting. Rather, a name determines its reference via a historical-causal link tracing back to the process of naming. And thus, Kripke thinks that a name does not have a sense, or, at least, does not have a sense which is rich enough to play the reference-determining role. Moreover, a name, in Kripke's view, is a rigid designator, which refers to the same object in all possible worlds. Following this line of thought, Kripke suggests that any scientific identity statement such as "Water is H2O" is also a necessary statement, i.e. true in all possible worlds. Kripke thinks that this is a phenomenon that the descriptivist cannot explain.<ref>Saul Kripke, ''Naming and Necessity, (1980) Harvard UP</ref>
+However, as Kripke argued in "Naming and Necessity", a name does not secure its reference via any process of description fitting. Rather, a name determines its reference via a historical-causal link tracing back to the process of naming. And thus, Kripke thinks that a name does not have a sense, or, at least, does not have a sense which is rich enough to play the reference-determining role. Moreover, a name, in Kripke's view, is a rigid designator, which refers to the same object in all possible worlds. Following this line of thought, Kripke suggests that any scientific identity statement such as "Water is H2O" is also a necessary statement, i.e. true in all possible worlds. Kripke thinks that this is a phenomenon that the descriptivist cannot explain.<ref>Saul Kripke, ''Naming and Necessity'' (1980) Harvard UP</ref>
 In his article on "Proper Names", John R. Searle argues that the sense of a name applies to proper names. He presents the following examples:

@@ Line 9: / Line 9: @@
 ==Philosophy==
 However, as Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity, a name does not secure its reference via any process of description fitting. Rather, a name determines its reference via a historical-causal link tracing back to the process of naming. And thus, Kripke thinks that a name does not have a sense, or, at least, does not have a sense which is rich enough to play the reference-determining role. Moreover, a name, in Kripke's view, is a rigid designator, which refers to the same object in all possible worlds. Following this line of thought, Kripke suggests that any scientific identity statement such as "Water is H2O" is also a necessary statement, i.e. true in all possible worlds. Kripke thinks that this is a phenomenon that the descriptivist cannot explain.<ref>Saul Kripke, ''Naming and Necessity, (1980) Harvard UP</ref>
 ==Reverences==
 [[Category: Identifier]]