Security Boundary - Revision history

Tom: /* Problems */

2024-11-26T04:51:02Z

‎Problems

Tom: /* The Ideal */

2018-07-26T18:11:37Z

‎The Ideal

Tom: /* The Ideal */

2018-07-26T18:10:15Z

‎The Ideal

Tom: /* The Ideal */

2018-07-26T18:08:33Z

‎The Ideal

Tom: /* Context */

2018-07-26T18:05:40Z

‎Context

Tom: /* References */

2018-07-25T17:44:06Z

‎References

Tom: /* Problems */

2018-07-25T17:41:18Z

‎Problems

Tom: /* Full Title or Meme */

2018-07-25T17:39:28Z

‎Full Title or Meme

Tom: Created page with "==Full Title or Meme== An imaginary definable perimeter encompassing all the critical functions in an INFOSEC product and separating them from all other functions within the p..."

2018-07-25T17:39:10Z

Created page with "==Full Title or Meme== An imaginary definable perimeter encompassing all the critical functions in an INFOSEC product and separating them from all other functions within the p..."

New page

==Full Title or Meme==
An imaginary definable perimeter encompassing all the critical functions in an INFOSEC product and separating them from all other functions within the product.<rev>NIST ''Glossary'' https://csrc.nist.gov/Glossary/?term=4819</ref>
==Context==
Since the very first [[Trusted Execution Environment]] in 1961 there has been the desire to place only a part of the [[Resource]]s of an enterprise in a location that is secure from attack.

==Problems==

==Solutions==

==References==

[[Category:Glossary]]

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 ===The Ideal===
-In an ideal world there will be computer systems that have protected data and other computer systems that have unprotected data, perhaps like an onion there will be several gradations of protections, each with their own access controls. All of the difficulties relate to the ways that data and control moves from one protection level to another. This problem was understood and analyzed at an early date in the US DoD.
+In an ideal world there will be computer systems that have protected data and other computer systems that have unprotected data, perhaps like an onion there will be several gradations of protections, each with their own access controls. All of the difficulties relate to the ways that data and control moves from one protection level to another. This problem was understood and analyzed at an early date in the US DoD. Even then it became clear that the flow of data and the flow of control resulted in contradictory requirements as shown in the two models described below.
 *BIBA
 *Bell LaPadula

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 ===The Ideal===
-In an ideal world there will be computer systems that have protected data and other computer systems that have unprotected data, perhaps like an onion there will be several gradations of protections, each with their own access controls.
+In an ideal world there will be computer systems that have protected data and other computer systems that have unprotected data, perhaps like an onion there will be several gradations of protections, each with their own access controls. All of the difficulties relate to the ways that data and control moves from one protection level to another. This problem was understood and analyzed at an early date in the US DoD.
 *BIBA
 *Bell LaPadula

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 ===The Ideal===
 *BIBA
 *Bell LaPadula
 ===The Real===
 Since the very first [[Trusted Execution Environment]] in 1961 there has been the desire to place only a part of the [[Resource]]s of an enterprise in a location that is secure from attack.

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:05, 26 July 2018
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	==Context==		==Context==
		+
		+	===The Ideal===
		+	*BIBA
		+	*Bell LaPadula
		+	===The Real===
	Since the very first [[Trusted Execution Environment]] in 1961 there has been the desire to place only a part of the [[Resource]]s of an enterprise in a location that is secure from attack.		Since the very first [[Trusted Execution Environment]] in 1961 there has been the desire to place only a part of the [[Resource]]s of an enterprise in a location that is secure from attack.

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:41, 25 July 2018
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	==Problems==		==Problems==
		+	All security boundaries have gateways that allow access to the protected [[Resource]]s. Determination of what accesses are permitted across a boundary is never more than an approximation of an impenetrable boundary.

	==Solutions==		==Solutions==

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 ==Problems==
 All security boundaries have gateways that allow access to the protected [[Resource]]s. Determination of what accesses are permitted across a boundary is never more than an approximation of an impenetrable boundary.
 ==Solutions==

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 ==References==
+One interesting note about the Glossary term referenced at NIST. It actually comes from the [https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm Committee on National Security Systems - Instructions] which is on a site with a DoD level 3 certificate, which is not trusted by any of the major browser vendors.
 [[Category:Glossary]]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ==Full Title or Meme==
-An imaginary definable perimeter encompassing all the critical functions in an INFOSEC product and separating them from all other functions within the product.<rev>NIST ''Glossary'' https://csrc.nist.gov/Glossary/?term=4819</ref>
+An imaginary definable perimeter encompassing all the critical functions in an INFOSEC product and separating them from all other functions within the product.<ref>NIST ''Glossary'' https://csrc.nist.gov/Glossary/?term=4819</ref>
 ==Context==
 Since the very first [[Trusted Execution Environment]] in 1961 there has been the desire to place only a part of the [[Resource]]s of an enterprise in a location that is secure from attack.