Smartphone Identity - Revision history

Tom: /* =Privacy Challenge */

2021-11-19T01:25:26Z

‎=Privacy Challenge

Tom: /* Inclusion */

2021-11-19T01:25:12Z

‎Inclusion

Tom: /* Creation */

2021-11-18T23:41:02Z

‎Creation

Tom: /* Verification */

2021-11-18T23:28:38Z

‎Verification

Tom: /* Storage */

2021-11-18T23:15:38Z

‎Storage

Tom: /* Storage */

2021-11-18T23:12:15Z

‎Storage

Tom: /* Storage */

2021-11-18T23:02:56Z

‎Storage

Tom: /* Storage */

2021-11-18T23:02:08Z

‎Storage

Tom: /* Storage */

2021-11-18T23:01:43Z

‎Storage

Tom at 21:53, 18 November 2021

2021-11-18T21:53:49Z

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
 # Backwards compatibility - consistent with timely responses to new attack vectors - allow users to stay with their existing devices for both cost and sustainability reasons.
-===Privacy Challenge==
+===Privacy Challenge===
 * The obvious leakage is from the Issuing and Verification Providers.
 * Less obvious leakage if from attacks on user data directly to the Smartphone or to the communications channel.

@@ Line 15: / Line 15: @@
 ===Inclusion===
 * There is always a tension between using the latest new security feature and providing support for the widest range of customers possible.
-* A similar tension exists between the commerial push to sell a new product versus support for legacy systems.
+* A similar tension exists between the commercial push to sell a new product versus support for legacy systems.
-* Succesful ecosystems try for a balance between support strategies for the existing communities with encouraging growth that will improve the overall health of the ecosystem as it moves into an uncertain future.
+* Successful ecosystems try for a balance between support strategies for the existing communities with encouraging growth that will improve the overall health of the ecosystem as it moves into an uncertain future.
 * With those tensions in mind here are some support strategies for the greatest spread of the benefit of technology for all:
 # Accessibility - support for the widest possible range of human abilities.
 # Some low cost solutions - support for all income groups and countries.
 # Backwards compatibility - consistent with timely responses to new attack vectors - allow users to stay with their existing devices for both cost and sustainability reasons.
 ==Creation==

@@ Line 23: / Line 23: @@
 ==Creation==
-The issuer of the user credential will need to have the trust of both the holder and the verifier of the credential, each with very different requirements as addressed below.
+The issuer of the user credential will need to have the trust of both the holder and the verifier of the credential, each with very different requirements as addressed below. In cases like the [[Mobile Driver's License]] the issuer will assure that an appropriate application is installed on the phone (see verification) before providing a credential from the user. Secure credentials will never be passed outside of the holder's control without explicate release of only those data elements that are required by the verifier after consent is received from the user.
 ==Storage==

@@ Line 33: / Line 33: @@
 ==Verification==
-The [[Relying Party]] adoption will determine the adoption of the technology. The reader of the data in the [[Smartphone]] may involve another human or be fully automated depending on the type of [[Authorization]] that the user is seeking.
+The [[Relying Party]] adoption will determine the adoption of the technology. The reader of the data in the [[Smartphone]] may involve another human or be fully automated depending on the type of [[Authorization]] that the user is seeking. "Establishing trust requires a bit of proof that the phone was manufactured to the expected security standard. User Identity is contained in the secret keys and credentials stored on the phone after signing by the issuers. The verifier will need some means to verify those cryptographic signatures.
 ==References==

@@ Line 30: / Line 30: @@
 "The goal is simple: Make it as hard as possible for attackers to steal credentials and use them at their leisure. Let's even make it difficult for users to clone their own credentials to share with other users. In addition to this protection, let's ensure that adding extra factors such as biometric authentication provides a strong assurance of who the user is."
-All modern smart phones include a [[Trusted Execution Environment]] that is either a separate TPM V1 chip or a software TPM V2 app running in the TEE that is part of the ARM hardware architecture. These TPMs will typically support signing and decryption operations within the TEE for the common FIPS approved algorithms of RSA and EC. That means that other encryption schemes, such as that used for [[Bitcoin]] can be stored hidden inside the TEE, but must be exported into the main process to run cryptographic processes.
+All modern smart phones include a [[Trusted Execution Environment]] that is either a separate TPM V1 chip or a software TPM V2 app running in the TEE that is part of the ARM hardware architecture. These TPMs will typically support signing and decryption operations within the TEE for the common FIPS approved algorithms of RSA and EC. That means that other encryption schemes, such as that used for [[Bitcoin]] can be stored hidden inside the TEE, but must be exported into the main process to run cryptographic processes. It is highly likely in 2021 that NIST will soon at the the FIPS approved algorithms to protect against [[Quantum Computing Threat]]s to existing cryptography. Then it will be several years before those become commonly used in commerce.
 ==Verification==

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:02, 18 November 2021
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	"The goal is simple: Make it as hard as possible for attackers to steal credentials and use them at their leisure. Let's even make it difficult for users to clone their own credentials to share with other users. In addition to this protection, let's ensure that adding extra factors such as biometric authentication provides a strong assurance of who the user is."		"The goal is simple: Make it as hard as possible for attackers to steal credentials and use them at their leisure. Let's even make it difficult for users to clone their own credentials to share with other users. In addition to this protection, let's ensure that adding extra factors such as biometric authentication provides a strong assurance of who the user is."
−	.	+
	All modern smart phones include a [[Trusted Execution Environment]] that is either a separate TPM V1 chip or a software TPM V2 app running in the TEE.		All modern smart phones include a [[Trusted Execution Environment]] that is either a separate TPM V1 chip or a software TPM V2 app running in the TEE.