Trust - Revision history

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‎History

Tom: /* History */

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‎History

Tom: /* Trusting the Ecosystem */

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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‎Trusting the Ecosystem

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 Since governments are almost never trusted, it will be a new experience to see how the EU brings up a trust infrastructure where every person and every business is depended on the trust registries where the individual states in the EU have the full authority and responsibility. Given the history that we have with state sponsored trust networks, like DigiNotar in the Netherlands, the outlook is not good.
-* 2025 [https://www.edelman.com/ Edelman Trust Barometer] show that a sense Grievance is rising as [[Trust]] is falling, primarily in the developed world.
+* 2025 [https://www.edelman.com/ Edelman Trust Barometer] show that a sense [[Grievance]] is rising as [[Trust]] is falling, primarily in the developed world.
 ==Context==

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:48, 6 April 2025
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	Since governments are almost never trusted, it will be a new experience to see how the EU brings up a trust infrastructure where every person and every business is depended on the trust registries where the individual states in the EU have the full authority and responsibility. Given the history that we have with state sponsored trust networks, like DigiNotar in the Netherlands, the outlook is not good.		Since governments are almost never trusted, it will be a new experience to see how the EU brings up a trust infrastructure where every person and every business is depended on the trust registries where the individual states in the EU have the full authority and responsibility. Given the history that we have with state sponsored trust networks, like DigiNotar in the Netherlands, the outlook is not good.
		+
		+	* 2025 [https://www.edelman.com/ Edelman Trust Barometer] show that a sense Grievance is rising as [[Trust]] is falling, primarily in the developed world.

	==Context==		==Context==

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 Humans are predisposed to trusting the natural ecosystem where they live. They expect the sun to rise every day and are not disappointed, even though the very idea of [[Induction]] of truths from facts was disparaged by philosophers starting from David Hume.
-Isn't the legal system created by sovereign government sufficient to provide a trust framework that all can share? Besides the problems noted when this was tried and failed in the Netherlands, we have this evaluation from economics by Fukuyama<ref name="Fukutama /> which can be applied to the new digital [[Ecosystem]] as well:
+Isn't the legal system created by sovereign government sufficient to provide a trust framework that all can share? Besides the problems noted when this was tried and failed in the Netherlands, we have this evaluation from economics by Fukuyama<ref name="fukuyama /> which can be applied to the new digital [[Ecosystem]] as well:
 <blockquote>
 The United States was, in other words, a relatively high-trust society throughout the period of its initial industrialization. This is not to say that Americans were uniformly moral or trustworthy. The great industrialists and financiers of the late nineteenth century, like Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, Andrew Mellon, and John D. Rockefeller, all developed reputations for ruthlessness and greed. The history of this period is full of scams and swindles and rapacious business activities unconstrained by the dense regulatory environment of the twentieth century. But for the economic system to have worked as well as it did, there had to be a significant element of generalized social trust.

@@ Line 120: / Line 120: @@
 Humans are predisposed to trusting the natural ecosystem where they live. They expect the sun to rise every day and are not disappointed, even though the very idea of [[Induction]] of truths from facts was disparaged by philosophers starting from David Hume.
-Isn't the legal system created by sovereign government sufficient to provide a trust framework that all can share? Besides the problems noted when this was tried and failed in the Netherlands, we have this evaluation from economics by Fukuyama<ref name="Fukutama /> which apply to the new digital [[Ecosystem]] as well:
+Isn't the legal system created by sovereign government sufficient to provide a trust framework that all can share? Besides the problems noted when this was tried and failed in the Netherlands, we have this evaluation from economics by Fukuyama<ref name="Fukutama /> which can be applied to the new digital [[Ecosystem]] as well:
 <blockquote>
 The United States was, in other words, a relatively high-trust society throughout the period of its initial industrialization. This is not to say that Americans were uniformly moral or trustworthy. The great industrialists and financiers of the late nineteenth century, like Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, Andrew Mellon, and John D. Rockefeller, all developed reputations for ruthlessness and greed. The history of this period is full of scams and swindles and rapacious business activities unconstrained by the dense regulatory environment of the twentieth century. But for the economic system to have worked as well as it did, there had to be a significant element of generalized social trust.

@@ Line 120: / Line 120: @@
 Humans are predisposed to trusting the natural ecosystem where they live. They expect the sun to rise every day and are not disappointed, even though the very idea of [[Induction]] of truths from facts was disparaged by philosophers starting from David Hume.
-Isn't the legal system created by sovereign government sufficient to provide a trust framework that all can share? Besides the problems noted when this was tried and failed in the Netherlands, we have this evaluation from economics by Fukuyama<ref name="Fukutama />
+Isn't the legal system created by sovereign government sufficient to provide a trust framework that all can share? Besides the problems noted when this was tried and failed in the Netherlands, we have this evaluation from economics by Fukuyama<ref name="Fukutama /> which apply to the new digital [[Ecosystem]] as well:
-<blockquote> which apply to the new digital [[Ecosystem]] as well:
+<blockquote>
 The United States was, in other words, a relatively high-trust society throughout the period of its initial industrialization. This is not to say that Americans were uniformly moral or trustworthy. The great industrialists and financiers of the late nineteenth century, like Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, Andrew Mellon, and John D. Rockefeller, all developed reputations for ruthlessness and greed. The history of this period is full of scams and swindles and rapacious business activities unconstrained by the dense regulatory environment of the twentieth century. But for the economic system to have worked as well as it did, there had to be a significant element of generalized social trust.

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 ...
 <blockquote>
-The answer to these questions [about trust] is that although property rights and other modern economic institutions were necessary for the creation of modern businesses, we are often unaware that the latter rest on a bedrock of social and cultural habits that are too often taken for granted. Modern institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern prosperity and the social well-being that it undergirds; they have to be combined with certain traditional social and ethical habits if they are to work properly. Contracts allow strangers with no basis for trust to work with one another, but the process works far more efficiently when the trust exists. Legal forms like joint-stock companies may allow unrelated people to collaborate, but how easily they do so depends on their cooperativeness when dealing with nonkin. The question of spontaneous sociability is particularly important because we cannot take these older ethical habits for granted. A rich and complex civil society does not arise inevitably out of the logic of advanced industrialization. On the contrary Japan, Germany, and the United States became the world's leading industrial powers in large part because they had healthy endowments of social capital and spontaneous sociability, and not vice versa.
+The answer to these questions [about economic trust] is that although property rights and other modern economic institutions were necessary for the creation of modern businesses, we are often unaware that the latter rest on a bedrock of social and cultural habits that are too often taken for granted. Modern institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern prosperity and the social well-being that it undergirds; they have to be combined with certain traditional social and ethical habits if they are to work properly. Contracts allow strangers with no basis for trust to work with one another, but the process works far more efficiently when the trust exists. Legal forms like joint-stock companies may allow unrelated people to collaborate, but how easily they do so depends on their cooperativeness when dealing with nonkin. The question of spontaneous sociability is particularly important because we cannot take these older ethical habits for granted. A rich and complex civil society does not arise inevitably out of the logic of advanced industrialization. On the contrary Japan, Germany, and the United States became the world's leading industrial powers in large part because they had healthy endowments of social capital and spontaneous sociability, and not vice versa.
 Liberal societies like the United States have a tendency toward individualism and a potentially debilitating social atomization. [T]here is evidence that in the United States, trust and the social habits that underlay its rise to greatness as an industrial power have eroded significantly in the past half-century. Some of the examples [in the book] should serve as a warning: it is possible for societies to lose social capital over time. France's once-flourishing and complex civil society, for example, was later undermined by an overly centralizing government.

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 On a political level, Americans expressed substantial distrust of concentrated economic power. The merger wave and the efforts of trusts like Standard Oil to monopolize markets led to the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust acts and the trust-busting populism of Theodore Roosevelt.
-</blockquote>...
+</blockquote>
 <blockquote>
 The answer to these questions [about trust] is that although property rights and other modern economic institutions were necessary for the creation of modern businesses, we are often unaware that the latter rest on a bedrock of social and cultural habits that are too often taken for granted. Modern institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern prosperity and the social well-being that it undergirds; they have to be combined with certain traditional social and ethical habits if they are to work properly. Contracts allow strangers with no basis for trust to work with one another, but the process works far more efficiently when the trust exists. Legal forms like joint-stock companies may allow unrelated people to collaborate, but how easily they do so depends on their cooperativeness when dealing with nonkin. The question of spontaneous sociability is particularly important because we cannot take these older ethical habits for granted. A rich and complex civil society does not arise inevitably out of the logic of advanced industrialization. On the contrary Japan, Germany, and the United States became the world's leading industrial powers in large part because they had healthy endowments of social capital and spontaneous sociability, and not vice versa.