Trust in Financial Institutions - Revision history

Tom: /* References */

2023-11-21T05:01:16Z

‎References

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‎Trusted Signatures

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‎Trusted Signatures

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‎Trusted Signatures

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‎Trusted Signatures

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‎Context

Tom: /* European Commission */

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‎European Commission

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‎European Commission

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2019-02-15T06:20:08Z

‎European Commission

Tom: /* Recognizing Good Governments */

2019-02-15T06:16:48Z

‎Recognizing Good Governments

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← Older revision		Revision as of 05:01, 21 November 2023
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	[[Category:Trust]]		[[Category:Trust]]
		+	[[Category: Liability]]

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 ==Trusted Signatures==
-The original check, or bank draft, depended exclusively on the signature, or seal, made by the owner of the assets held by the bank. If the signature was forged; the bank might be held liable for the loss of any such forged draft. The banks try to avoid liability so the used any change in technology to reduce their liability. For example, when check images were introduced to replace paper checks, the banks wrote into the law that they didn't need to compare signatures any longer. Then when electronic teller machines were introduced, they held the customer responsible for fraud loss. Many central banks later discovered that banks were doing a poor job at security, because it was no longer their risk of loss. When that happened, most central banks limited the loss to individual consumers. Now that direct electronic payments are on the rise, consumers are again seeing the attempt by bankers to foist their bad security off on their customers. See the web page [https://zellefraud.com/ Zelle Fraud] for an example in the US. The UK is experiencing the same effect.
+The original check, or bank draft, depended exclusively on the signature, or seal, made by the owner of the assets held by the bank. If the signature was forged; the bank might be held liable for the loss of any such forged draft. The banks try to avoid [[Liability]] so the used any change in technology to reduce their liability. For example, when check images were introduced to replace paper checks, the banks wrote into the law that they didn't need to compare signatures any longer. Then when electronic teller machines were introduced, they held the customer responsible for fraud loss. Many central banks later discovered that banks were doing a poor job at security, because it was no longer their risk of loss. When that happened, most central banks limited the loss to individual consumers. Now that direct electronic payments are on the rise, consumers are again seeing the attempt by bankers to foist their bad security off on their customers. See the web page [https://zellefraud.com/ Zelle Fraud] for an example in the US. The UK is experiencing the same effect.
 Samuel M Smith PhD 1st degree connection1st Creator KERI at KERI.one wrote this on 2022-02-22 about digital signatures in [[Verifiable Credential]]s. If this principle were applied to asset transfer, consumers will be defrauded with no recourse.<blockquote>

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 The original check, or bank draft, depended exclusively on the signature, or seal, made by the owner of the assets held by the bank. If the signature was forged; the bank might be held liable for the loss of any such forged draft. The banks try to avoid liability so the used any change in technology to reduce their liability. For example, when check images were introduced to replace paper checks, the banks wrote into the law that they didn't need to compare signatures any longer. Then when electronic teller machines were introduced, they held the customer responsible for fraud loss. Many central banks later discovered that banks were doing a poor job at security, because it was no longer their risk of loss. When that happened, most central banks limited the loss to individual consumers. Now that direct electronic payments are on the rise, consumers are again seeing the attempt by bankers to foist their bad security off on their customers. See the web page [https://zellefraud.com/ Zelle Fraud] for an example in the US. The UK is experiencing the same effect.
-Samuel M Smith PhD 1st degree connection1st Creator KERI at KERI.one wrote this on 2022-02-22 about digital signatures in [[Verifiable Credential]]s. If this principle were applied to asset transfer, consumer will be defrauded with no recourse.<blockquote>
+Samuel M Smith PhD 1st degree connection1st Creator KERI at KERI.one wrote this on 2022-02-22 about digital signatures in [[Verifiable Credential]]s. If this principle were applied to asset transfer, consumers will be defrauded with no recourse.<blockquote>
 Tom Jones I think that you are putting the burden of proof in the wrong place. The assumption is that ecosystem in which the holder or controller of the private key i.e the signer and the verifier of the signature operate makes the signer accountable for its own key compromise. The signer by virtue of engaging in discourse using a digital signature accepts that liability and therefore has incentive to keep it a secret. This is the legal framework that EiDAS (EU) and ESIGN and UETA in North America are based on. Thus, the signer has the burden of proof to prove forgery not the verifier.

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 ==Trusted Signatures==
-The original check, or bank draft, depended exclusively on the signature, or seal, made by the owner of the assets held by the bank. If the signature was forged; the bank might be held liable for the loss of any such forged draft. The banks try to avoid liability so the used any change in technology to reduce their liability. For example, when check images were introduced to replace paper checks, the banks wrote into the law that they didn't need to compare signatures any longer. Then when electronic teller machines were introduced, they held the customer responsible for fraud loss. Many central banks later discovered that banks were doing a poor job at security, because it was no longer their risk of loss. When that happened, most central banks limited the loss to individual consumers. Now that direct electronic payments are on the rise, consumers are again seeing the attempt by bankers to foist their bad security off on their customers. See the web page [https://zellefraud.com/ Zelle Fraud] for example in the US. The UK is experiencing the same effect.
+The original check, or bank draft, depended exclusively on the signature, or seal, made by the owner of the assets held by the bank. If the signature was forged; the bank might be held liable for the loss of any such forged draft. The banks try to avoid liability so the used any change in technology to reduce their liability. For example, when check images were introduced to replace paper checks, the banks wrote into the law that they didn't need to compare signatures any longer. Then when electronic teller machines were introduced, they held the customer responsible for fraud loss. Many central banks later discovered that banks were doing a poor job at security, because it was no longer their risk of loss. When that happened, most central banks limited the loss to individual consumers. Now that direct electronic payments are on the rise, consumers are again seeing the attempt by bankers to foist their bad security off on their customers. See the web page [https://zellefraud.com/ Zelle Fraud] for an example in the US. The UK is experiencing the same effect.
 Samuel M Smith PhD 1st degree connection1st Creator KERI at KERI.one wrote this on 2022-02-22 about digital signatures in [[Verifiable Credential]]s. If this principle were applied to asset transfer, consumer will be defrauded with no recourse.<blockquote>

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 The original check, or bank draft, depended exclusively on the signature, or seal, made by the owner of the assets held by the bank. If the signature was forged; the bank might be held liable for the loss of any such forged draft. The banks try to avoid liability so the used any change in technology to reduce their liability. For example, when check images were introduced to replace paper checks, the banks wrote into the law that they didn't need to compare signatures any longer. Then when electronic teller machines were introduced, they held the customer responsible for fraud loss. Many central banks later discovered that banks were doing a poor job at security, because it was no longer their risk of loss. When that happened, most central banks limited the loss to individual consumers. Now that direct electronic payments are on the rise, consumers are again seeing the attempt by bankers to foist their bad security off on their customers. See the web page [https://zellefraud.com/ Zelle Fraud] for example in the US. The UK is experiencing the same effect.
-Samuel M Smith PhD 1st degree connection1st Creator KERI at KERI.one wrote this on 2022-02-22 about digital signatures in [[Verifiable Credential]]s. If this principle were applied to asset transfer, consumer will be defrauded with no recourse.
+Samuel M Smith PhD 1st degree connection1st Creator KERI at KERI.one wrote this on 2022-02-22 about digital signatures in [[Verifiable Credential]]s. If this principle were applied to asset transfer, consumer will be defrauded with no recourse.<blockquote>
 Tom Jones I think that you are putting the burden of proof in the wrong place. The assumption is that ecosystem in which the holder or controller of the private key i.e the signer and the verifier of the signature operate makes the signer accountable for its own key compromise. The signer by virtue of engaging in discourse using a digital signature accepts that liability and therefore has incentive to keep it a secret. This is the legal framework that EiDAS (EU) and ESIGN and UETA in North America are based on. Thus, the signer has the burden of proof to prove forgery not the verifier.
-The point of using a Verifiable Data Structure for key state is to enable a verifier to appraise the key management quality and assess the associated risk to better protect itself but it does not remove the accountability and liability from the signer should the signer not protect its keys. One of the things KERI does is provide recovery and reconciliation rules so that both signer and verifier can bound their own risks with respect to a transaction involving a signature by the signer. This risk can be moderated by using a third-party notary that insures (see EiDAS) signatures.
+The point of using a Verifiable Data Structure for key state is to enable a verifier to appraise the key management quality and assess the associated risk to better protect itself but it does not remove the accountability and liability from the signer should the signer not protect its keys. One of the things KERI does is provide recovery and reconciliation rules so that both signer and verifier can bound their own risks with respect to a transaction involving a signature by the signer. This risk can be moderated by using a third-party notary that insures (see EiDAS) signatures.</blockquote>
 ==Recognizing Good Governments==

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 The rules that governments use today to control their fiat currencies are focused on two primary problems, debasement by techniques like counterfeiting and misuse like money laundering. This article focuses on the governments'
 efforts to control misuses and the trouble that their efforts create for identifiers of humans and other legal entities.
 ==Recognizing Good Governments==

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 ===European Commission===
-Has taken it upon itself to issue [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-781_en.htm lists of third countries with weak anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regimes]. Which include 4 possession of the United States and Saudi Arabia, which is jointly responsible for the [https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0092.aspx Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC)], a collaborative approach to confronting new and evolving threats arising from terrorist financing.<ref>Jack Ewing +1, Europe Flags U.S. Territories in 'Dirty Money' List. (2019-02-14> The New York Times p. B4</ref>
+Has taken it upon itself to issue [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-781_en.htm lists of third countries with weak anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regimes]. Which include 4 possession of the United States and Saudi Arabia, which is jointly responsible for the [https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0092.aspx Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC)], a collaborative approach to confronting new and evolving threats arising from terrorist financing.<ref>Jack Ewing +1, ''Europe Flags U.S. Territories in 'Dirty Money' List.'' (2019-02-14) The New York Times p. B4</ref>
 But chose not to list these countries which are either part of the EU or close trading partners, but are on the FATF list or have been sanctioned by the EU:

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 # [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2070094/Channel-Islands-left-off-EUs-money-laundering-white-list.html The Channel Islands]
 # [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-moneylaundering/eu-steps-up-legal-action-against-malta-luxembourg-over-money-laundering-idUSKCN1ND1MH Luxembourg or Malta]
 ==References==
 [[Category:Trust]]