Trusted Execution Environment - Revision history

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‎Problems

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‎Problems

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‎Security Boundaries

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‎Solutions Today

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‎Access APIs

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‎Solutions Today

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‎Solutions Today

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 ==Problems==
 * Aaron Joy +4, ''Physical and Software Based Fault Injection Attacks Against TEEs in Mobile Devices: A Systemisation of Knowledge'' https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.14878
 ==Solutions Today==

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 ==Problems==
-* Aaron Joy +4, Physical and Software Based Fault Injection Attacks Against TEEs in Mobile Devices: A Systemisation of Knowledge https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.14878
+* Aaron Joy +4, ''Physical and Software Based Fault Injection Attacks Against TEEs in Mobile Devices: A Systemisation of Knowledge'' https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.14878
 ==Solutions Today==

@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
 * Protected memory needs to be available for the secure storage of secrets, that does require some level of hardware support which may include (1) a completely separate secure memory, (2) hardware protection of some main memory partitions that can still be broken as evidenced by the recent exploits of Intel memory mapping<ref>''Meltdown and Spectre.'' https://meltdownattack.com/</ref> and (3) inline encryption of secure data in main memory as implemented in the Intel Data Security Operation chip in 1995.
---Problems==
+==Problems==
 * Aaron Joy +4, Physical and Software Based Fault Injection Attacks Against TEEs in Mobile Devices: A Systemisation of Knowledge https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.14878
 ==Solutions Today==
 The space of [[Trusted Execution Environment]]s, [[Hardware Protection|Hardware Security Modules (HSM)]] and [[TPM]]s are merging into the broader category of [[Hardware-Enabled Security]] as reported by the Center for Hardware Security.<ref>Kathleen M. Moriarty, ''Built-in Security at Scale through Hardware Support'' (2023-12) https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/white-papers/built-in-security-at-scale-through-hardware-support</ref> This is already very wide spread in servers and is increasingly common in personal mobile devices.

@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
 * Protected memory needs to be available for the secure storage of secrets, that does require some level of hardware support which may include (1) a completely separate secure memory, (2) hardware protection of some main memory partitions that can still be broken as evidenced by the recent exploits of Intel memory mapping<ref>''Meltdown and Spectre.'' https://meltdownattack.com/</ref> and (3) inline encryption of secure data in main memory as implemented in the Intel Data Security Operation chip in 1995.
 ==Solutions Today==
 The space of [[Trusted Execution Environment]]s, [[Hardware Protection|Hardware Security Modules (HSM)]] and [[TPM]]s are merging into the broader category of [[Hardware-Enabled Security]] as reported by the Center for Hardware Security.<ref>Kathleen M. Moriarty, ''Built-in Security at Scale through Hardware Support'' (2023-12) https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/white-papers/built-in-security-at-scale-through-hardware-support</ref> This is already very wide spread in servers and is increasingly common in personal mobile devices.

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 ===Access [[API]]s===
-* Before any of the functionality of the [[Trusted Execution Environment]] or [[Trusted Computing]] can have a measurable effect on user security, the functionality must be exposed to the programmers that code the applications that the users want. There are a few APIs, like [[Open SSL]] which are accessible to the programmers, but the key problem of protecting keys used by applications programs is still fragmented. The following are the most important [[API]]s addressing that issue.
+* Before any of the functionality of the [[Trusted Execution Environment]] or [[Trusted Computing]] can have a measurable effect on user security, the functionality must be exposed to the programmers that code the applications that the users want. There are a few APIs, like [[OpenSSL]] which are accessible to the programmers, but the key problem of protecting keys used by applications programs is still fragmented. The following are the most important [[API]]s addressing that issue.
 * With the completion of the Secure Android effort hosted by the NSA until 2018 it has been possible to use the ARM hardware to enable a [[Trusted Execution Environment]]. There have been various force arrayed against putting so much security in the hands of users<ref>Anit Vasudevan +2, ''Trustworthy Execution on Mobile Devices'' Springer (2014) https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461481898</ref> Recently Apple and others decided that it was in their interest to expose these capabilities to users in spite of growing pressure against providing strong encryption to consumers by the US government.<ref>Tami Abdollah, ''US attorney general says encryption creates security risk'' AP (2019-07-23) https://www.apnews.com/7423e1ef65a144e6a47e4da63683b3c1</ref> The challenge here is that improving  [[Security Risk]] for consumers will created  [[Security Risk]] for security services in governments.
 ====Windows====