Difference between revisions of "Knowledge"
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The way in which human [[Knowledge]] is best view as a [[Evolution]] process is found in this quote by Sellars: | The way in which human [[Knowledge]] is best view as a [[Evolution]] process is found in this quote by Sellars: | ||
− | Empirical [[Knowledge]], like its sophisticated extension, science is rational … because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put ''any'' claim in jeopardy, ''thought not all at once''.<ref>W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality. (1963) p. 170 ISBN </ref> | + | Empirical [[Knowledge]], like its sophisticated extension, science is rational … |
+ | because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put ''any'' claim in jeopardy, ''thought not all at once''.<ref>W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality. (1963) p. 170 ISBN </ref> |
Revision as of 11:03, 10 August 2018
Contents
Full Title or Meme
Facts, information, and skills acquired by a person through experience and education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.
Context
A significant number of philosophers have convinced themselves that there is no way that a computer could ever be said to have human Knowledge of any subject.
- Searls: The Chinese room
- Haldane: Chemical factory in our brain
Actually I hope that they are correct for I would certainly never trust a computer that had been trained using human behavior
I hope for some thing better
When ethicists talk about building an ethic into a computer program
Microsoft learned the hard truth that letting a computer learn on the internet was perhaps the worst decision that they have ever made
Problem
Solution
The way in which human Knowledge is best view as a Evolution process is found in this quote by Sellars:
Empirical Knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science is rational …because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, thought not all at once.[1]
- ↑ W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality. (1963) p. 170 ISBN