Difference between revisions of "OAuth 2.0"
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* OAuth 2.0 still depends on shared secrets between services on [[Web Site]]s and other internet devices;<ref>Justin Richer, ''What's Wrong With OAuth 2?'' https://twitter.com/justin__richer/status/1023738139200778240</ref> while most sites are protected by public keys and certificates, at least until quantum computing arrives. | * OAuth 2.0 still depends on shared secrets between services on [[Web Site]]s and other internet devices;<ref>Justin Richer, ''What's Wrong With OAuth 2?'' https://twitter.com/justin__richer/status/1023738139200778240</ref> while most sites are protected by public keys and certificates, at least until quantum computing arrives. | ||
* It is still just a collection of parts that can be configured in a wide variety of combinations; most of which are not particularly secure. | * It is still just a collection of parts that can be configured in a wide variety of combinations; most of which are not particularly secure. | ||
| − | * Token type "bearer" is still the only one used in real-world implementations. | + | * Token type "bearer" is still the only one used in real-world implementations. See the page [[Bearer Tokens Considered Harmful]] on this wiki. |
* The redirect URL is not well specified in the spec and is subject many exploits. The problem is poor implementations and reuse of each client id across many implementations. | * The redirect URL is not well specified in the spec and is subject many exploits. The problem is poor implementations and reuse of each client id across many implementations. | ||
* HTTP refer header is usually sent in the clear and contains way too much information in Front Channel implementations. | * HTTP refer header is usually sent in the clear and contains way too much information in Front Channel implementations. | ||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
* State parameters are needed for security, but not required by the spec. | * State parameters are needed for security, but not required by the spec. | ||
* A bunch of specs implemented other ways to enable secure, such as UMA, PCKE, etc. | * A bunch of specs implemented other ways to enable secure, such as UMA, PCKE, etc. | ||
| + | * Implicit flow was added to enable javascript, but recent innovations in browser has weaken the existing very weak security. | ||
| + | * Resource Owner password turned into a really bad idea. It should be banned. | ||
| + | * Scopes were created, but not explicitly defined, so there is no way to determine what a scope actually means. | ||
| + | * Discovery is not well defined, but always leaks information. | ||
==Solutions== | ==Solutions== | ||
| + | *Switch OAuth from [[Bearer Token]]s to [[Bound Token]]s | ||
| + | *Justin Richer has some suggestions.<ref>Justin Richer, ''Moving On from OAuth 2: A Proposal.'' https://medium.com/@justinsecurity/moving-on-from-oauth-2-629a00133ade</ref> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 15:14, 1 November 2018
Full Title or Meme
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
Context
In OAuth 2.0
Problems
- OAuth 2.0 still depends on shared secrets between services on Web Sites and other internet devices;[1] while most sites are protected by public keys and certificates, at least until quantum computing arrives.
- It is still just a collection of parts that can be configured in a wide variety of combinations; most of which are not particularly secure.
- Token type "bearer" is still the only one used in real-world implementations. See the page Bearer Tokens Considered Harmful on this wiki.
- The redirect URL is not well specified in the spec and is subject many exploits. The problem is poor implementations and reuse of each client id across many implementations.
- HTTP refer header is usually sent in the clear and contains way too much information in Front Channel implementations.
- Security UX is complicated and not described in the spec.
- State parameters are needed for security, but not required by the spec.
- A bunch of specs implemented other ways to enable secure, such as UMA, PCKE, etc.
- Implicit flow was added to enable javascript, but recent innovations in browser has weaken the existing very weak security.
- Resource Owner password turned into a really bad idea. It should be banned.
- Scopes were created, but not explicitly defined, so there is no way to determine what a scope actually means.
- Discovery is not well defined, but always leaks information.
Solutions
- Switch OAuth from Bearer Tokens to Bound Tokens
- Justin Richer has some suggestions.[2]
References
- RFC 6749 The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework specification
- RFC 8252 OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps Specification
