Difference between revisions of "ECDSA"
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| − | [1] Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250). | + | [1] Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250). |
| − | [2] Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE. | + | [2] Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE. |
==References== | ==References== | ||
[[Category: Cryptography]] | [[Category: Cryptography]] | ||
Revision as of 17:18, 10 November 2024
Full Title
Elliptic Curves with DSA
Context
One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key [1,2].
[1] Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250).
[2] Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.
