Difference between revisions of "Age Verification"
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==Definition== | ==Definition== | ||
Use of digital certificates to prove age for access to age restricted resources or products. | Use of digital certificates to prove age for access to age restricted resources or products. | ||
| − | + | ||
==Context== | ==Context== | ||
| − | + | ||
* [https://www.linkedin.com/company/age-verification-providers-association/ Age Verification Providers Association] Maintaining high standards in age verification | * [https://www.linkedin.com/company/age-verification-providers-association/ Age Verification Providers Association] Maintaining high standards in age verification | ||
| + | * Use of [[Mobile Driver's License Presentation]] for [[Age Verification]] f[https://www.mdlconnection.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/FINAL-Accept-mDL-Use-Cases-for-Age-Verification-for-Alcohol-Purchase.pdf ocuses on existing use cases] | ||
* decalogue-principles-age-verification-minors-protection.pdf (aepd.es) | * decalogue-principles-age-verification-minors-protection.pdf (aepd.es) | ||
* https://www.aepd.es/guides/decalogue-principles-age-verification-minors-protection.pdf | * https://www.aepd.es/guides/decalogue-principles-age-verification-minors-protection.pdf | ||
==Problems== | ==Problems== | ||
| + | ===Web Site Access=== | ||
| + | The original purpose of the world wide web was to make content available to all with out censorship. Advocates like John Perry Barlow wanted the web to created like a [[Common Good]] not subject to the sort of enclosure that lead to the economic [[Great Transformation]] (qv). | ||
| + | |||
| + | Opponents argue that mandatory, large-scale age verification will lead to the destruction of the web as we know it by eroding user privacy and anonymity, stifling free expression, and creating a less accessible, less competitive, and less secure internet. While intended to protect minors, critics warn the systems would create more problems than they solve for all users. | ||
| + | * Threat to user privacy and anonymity | ||
| + | * Massive data honeypots: Verification would require sites to collect sensitive personal data, such as government-issued IDs, facial scans, or financial information, from all users. This would create enormous "honeypots" of data, making users highly vulnerable to data breaches, identity theft, and government surveillance. | ||
| + | * Loss of anonymity: Mandatory age checks eliminate anonymous access to online information and services, which is essential for sensitive topics. This affects marginalized communities, including LGBTQ+ people, sex workers, and abuse victims, who rely on online anonymity to seek information and community safely. | ||
| + | Data tracking: Even with privacy-preserving technologies like Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP), concerns remain over how third-party verification companies would prevent tracking of users' online activities. | ||
| + | Erosion of free expression | ||
| + | *Chilling effect: The fear of being surveilled or exposed could deter adults from accessing legal content, suppressing free expression and online speech. People may feel afraid to look up information related to reproductive health or other sensitive subjects for fear of creating a permanent paper trail. | ||
| + | *Over-restriction of content: Websites may choose to broadly restrict content for all ages to avoid legal liability, rather than risking non-compliance. This would lead to a more censored and homogenized internet, where diverse or edgy content is removed entirely. | ||
| + | Disproportionate burden on small creators: The high cost of implementing age verification technology would be prohibitive for independent websites, small businesses, and individual creators. Only large, well-resourced corporations could afford compliance, potentially eliminating the independent web and consolidating control among tech giants. | ||
| + | Reduced accessibility and increased insecurity | ||
| + | Exclusion of vulnerable populations: Millions of adults who lack government-issued ID or credit cards—often those with lower incomes—could be locked out of large parts of the internet. | ||
| + | Failure to protect children: Verification systems are not foolproof and can be circumvented by tech-savvy minors using VPNs, stolen accounts, or fake IDs. This creates a false sense of security while exposing minors' sensitive data to risk. | ||
| + | Burdensome for users: A fragmented system of verification across countless websites would be inconvenient and frustrating for all users, potentially driving many away from online participation. Some biometric-based verification methods could also exclude users with certain physical conditions. | ||
| + | A patchwork of ineffective laws | ||
| + | The push for widespread age verification is taking place through inconsistent state and national laws, leading to a confusing and unenforceable patchwork of requirements. This approach fails to address the internet's global nature and is ultimately less effective than alternative solutions. Alternatives that have been suggested include: | ||
| + | Stronger parental controls | ||
| + | Education on internet safety | ||
| + | Industry self-regulation | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===Not like other ID standards=== | ||
| + | 2024-10-04 [https://www.biometricupdate.com/202410/the-eudi-wallet-was-not-meant-for-age-assurance-avpa The EUDI Wallet was not meant for age assurance: AVPA] | ||
| + | ===legal trouble=== | ||
It is typically the sales personnel and the shop owner that are penalized if the [[Age Verification]] fails: | It is typically the sales personnel and the shop owner that are penalized if the [[Age Verification]] fails: | ||
| Line 23: | Line 49: | ||
==Solutions== | ==Solutions== | ||
| + | * 2024-10 The AVPA responds to Drew Harwell’s article in the Washington Post. https://avpassociation.com/news-release/the-avpa-responds-to-drew-harwells-article-in-the-washington-post/ | ||
| + | * AVPA - The Age Verification Providers Association - [https://avpassociation.com/standards-for-age-verification/ Standards for Age Verification] | ||
| + | * 2024-05 IEEE 2089.1 Standard for Online Age Verification was published in May 2024, the result of over two years of deliberation by a working group of industry experts from around the world. Which costs $77 just to even read. Unclear how a threat model would be possible. | ||
* https://events.ringcentral.com/events/global-age-assurance-standards-summit/registration | * https://events.ringcentral.com/events/global-age-assurance-standards-summit/registration | ||
* On 2024-04-12 at the [https://events.ringcentral.com/events/global-age-assurance-standards-summit/registration Global Age Summit], [https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt_age_estimation.html National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published independent Face Age Estimation] vendor results which likely provide clear, scientific evidence that: | * On 2024-04-12 at the [https://events.ringcentral.com/events/global-age-assurance-standards-summit/registration Global Age Summit], [https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt_age_estimation.html National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published independent Face Age Estimation] vendor results which likely provide clear, scientific evidence that: | ||
Latest revision as of 11:23, 24 August 2025
Contents
Definition
Use of digital certificates to prove age for access to age restricted resources or products.
Context
- Age Verification Providers Association Maintaining high standards in age verification
- Use of Mobile Driver's License Presentation for Age Verification focuses on existing use cases
- decalogue-principles-age-verification-minors-protection.pdf (aepd.es)
- https://www.aepd.es/guides/decalogue-principles-age-verification-minors-protection.pdf
Problems
Web Site Access
The original purpose of the world wide web was to make content available to all with out censorship. Advocates like John Perry Barlow wanted the web to created like a Common Good not subject to the sort of enclosure that lead to the economic Great Transformation (qv).
Opponents argue that mandatory, large-scale age verification will lead to the destruction of the web as we know it by eroding user privacy and anonymity, stifling free expression, and creating a less accessible, less competitive, and less secure internet. While intended to protect minors, critics warn the systems would create more problems than they solve for all users.
- Threat to user privacy and anonymity
- Massive data honeypots: Verification would require sites to collect sensitive personal data, such as government-issued IDs, facial scans, or financial information, from all users. This would create enormous "honeypots" of data, making users highly vulnerable to data breaches, identity theft, and government surveillance.
- Loss of anonymity: Mandatory age checks eliminate anonymous access to online information and services, which is essential for sensitive topics. This affects marginalized communities, including LGBTQ+ people, sex workers, and abuse victims, who rely on online anonymity to seek information and community safely.
Data tracking: Even with privacy-preserving technologies like Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP), concerns remain over how third-party verification companies would prevent tracking of users' online activities. Erosion of free expression
- Chilling effect: The fear of being surveilled or exposed could deter adults from accessing legal content, suppressing free expression and online speech. People may feel afraid to look up information related to reproductive health or other sensitive subjects for fear of creating a permanent paper trail.
- Over-restriction of content: Websites may choose to broadly restrict content for all ages to avoid legal liability, rather than risking non-compliance. This would lead to a more censored and homogenized internet, where diverse or edgy content is removed entirely.
Disproportionate burden on small creators: The high cost of implementing age verification technology would be prohibitive for independent websites, small businesses, and individual creators. Only large, well-resourced corporations could afford compliance, potentially eliminating the independent web and consolidating control among tech giants. Reduced accessibility and increased insecurity Exclusion of vulnerable populations: Millions of adults who lack government-issued ID or credit cards—often those with lower incomes—could be locked out of large parts of the internet. Failure to protect children: Verification systems are not foolproof and can be circumvented by tech-savvy minors using VPNs, stolen accounts, or fake IDs. This creates a false sense of security while exposing minors' sensitive data to risk. Burdensome for users: A fragmented system of verification across countless websites would be inconvenient and frustrating for all users, potentially driving many away from online participation. Some biometric-based verification methods could also exclude users with certain physical conditions. A patchwork of ineffective laws The push for widespread age verification is taking place through inconsistent state and national laws, leading to a confusing and unenforceable patchwork of requirements. This approach fails to address the internet's global nature and is ultimately less effective than alternative solutions. Alternatives that have been suggested include: Stronger parental controls Education on internet safety Industry self-regulation
Not like other ID standards
2024-10-04 The EUDI Wallet was not meant for age assurance: AVPA
legal trouble
It is typically the sales personnel and the shop owner that are penalized if the Age Verification fails:
Selling age-restricted products to a minor may result in criminal charge(s) being filed against the person who sold! Reference RCW 66.44.270 and RCW 26.28.080
What does this mean to the employee?
- You may be placed under arrest and charged with a criminal offense.
- You may have to obtain a defense attorney to defend yourself.
- You may have to appear in court.
- You may be fined or imprisoned.
- Your may lose your job.
Solutions
- 2024-10 The AVPA responds to Drew Harwell’s article in the Washington Post. https://avpassociation.com/news-release/the-avpa-responds-to-drew-harwells-article-in-the-washington-post/
- AVPA - The Age Verification Providers Association - Standards for Age Verification
- 2024-05 IEEE 2089.1 Standard for Online Age Verification was published in May 2024, the result of over two years of deliberation by a working group of industry experts from around the world. Which costs $77 just to even read. Unclear how a threat model would be possible.
- https://events.ringcentral.com/events/global-age-assurance-standards-summit/registration
- On 2024-04-12 at the Global Age Summit, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published independent Face Age Estimation vendor results which likely provide clear, scientific evidence that:
- almost all parents of 14-15 year olds (likely to be aged 29+) can prove they’re over 25
- most adults can prove they’re at least 16 without needing to submit names, DoBs, address info or govt photo ID to social media sites.
- Yoti FAE is a popular age check method chosen by Americans (& individuals globally) when offered on porn sites, social media sites, #tobacco, #vaping sites & #gaming sites. These are facts - backed by scientific data which regulators can check with many businesses offering a range of Yoti age check methods.
UK
- response to UK gov't 2024-04-04
