Difference between revisions of "Hardware Protection"
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*Latest version as of 2019-05-22 is [https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf FIPS 140-3], version 3. | *Latest version as of 2019-05-22 is [https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf FIPS 140-3], version 3. | ||
* The [https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/trusted-platform-module-tpm-summary/ TPM (Trusted Platform Module)] version 1 was a purely hardware version of protection that was offered only as a stand alone chip. With version 2 defined as software, it can be (and often is) included in any [[Trusted Execution Environment]]. | * The [https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/trusted-platform-module-tpm-summary/ TPM (Trusted Platform Module)] version 1 was a purely hardware version of protection that was offered only as a stand alone chip. With version 2 defined as software, it can be (and often is) included in any [[Trusted Execution Environment]]. | ||
| + | * The first Hardware Protection was provided by a produce from the Intel Data Security Operation that was built, but never shipped. The DSO was disbanded on 1996-01-11. The devices was based on the i386 design with full memory bus encryption so that it could use the normal memory bus in DMA mode. | ||
==Problems== | ==Problems== | ||
Revision as of 16:41, 25 November 2020
Full Title
Hardware Protection offered by Hardware Security Modules (HSM see FIPS 140) or management chips.
Context
- Latest version as of 2019-05-22 is FIPS 140-3, version 3.
- The TPM (Trusted Platform Module) version 1 was a purely hardware version of protection that was offered only as a stand alone chip. With version 2 defined as software, it can be (and often is) included in any Trusted Execution Environment.
- The first Hardware Protection was provided by a produce from the Intel Data Security Operation that was built, but never shipped. The DSO was disbanded on 1996-01-11. The devices was based on the i386 design with full memory bus encryption so that it could use the normal memory bus in DMA mode.
Problems
When hardware contains software, and particularly when it contains firmware, it no longer has the same level of protection that a purely hardware solution offers. For example the Apple T2 chip has been hacked and cannot be fixed in the field.[1]
References
- ↑ Lily Hey Newman, Apple's T2 Security Chip Has an Unfixable Flaw (2020-10-05) https://www.wired.com/story/apple-t2-chip-unfixable-flaw-jailbreak-mac/
Other Material
- See wiki page Smart Phone for a discussion of hardware versus software protection within a modern ARM based Trusted Execution Environment.
