Difference between revisions of "Induction"
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==Problems== | ==Problems== | ||
| − | * Induction is roundly criticized as unprovable since the time of David Hume in the | + | * Induction is roundly criticized as unprovable since the time of David Hume in the West. If we look back to Rome we find the doubt beginning with Sextus Empiricus ( c. 160 – c. 210 AD)<ref> Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book II, Chapter 15 Section 204 trans. Robert Gregg Bury (Loeb ed.) (London: W. Heinemann, 1933), p. 283.</ref><blockquote>It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method of induction. For, when they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review either of all or of some of the particular instances. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction is invalidated.</blockquote> |
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 10:53, 20 December 2020
Contents
Mime
Induction is the process that leads us to the conclusions we need to stay alive and functioning in the creation of Models of the Ecosystem where were live.
Context
Deduction is inference deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true, with the laws of valid inference being studied in logic. Induction is inference from particular premises to a universal conclusion. ... Statistical inference uses mathematics to draw conclusions in the presence of uncertainty.
Problems
- Induction is roundly criticized as unprovable since the time of David Hume in the West. If we look back to Rome we find the doubt beginning with Sextus Empiricus ( c. 160 – c. 210 AD)[1]
It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method of induction. For, when they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review either of all or of some of the particular instances. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction is invalidated.
References
- ↑ Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book II, Chapter 15 Section 204 trans. Robert Gregg Bury (Loeb ed.) (London: W. Heinemann, 1933), p. 283.
