Difference between revisions of "ECDSA"
From MgmtWiki
(→Full Title) |
|||
| (One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 3: | Line 3: | ||
==Context== | ==Context== | ||
| − | One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key | + | One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key.<ref>Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250)</ref><ref>Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.</ref> |
* [https://asecuritysite.com/sage/sage_ecdsa_crack_fault Here is the Sage code for this] | * [https://asecuritysite.com/sage/sage_ecdsa_crack_fault Here is the Sage code for this] | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
[[Category: Cryptography]] | [[Category: Cryptography]] | ||
Latest revision as of 17:21, 10 November 2024
Full Title
Elliptic Curves with DSA
Context
One of the weaknesses of ECDSA is a fault attack. In the fault attack in ECDSA we only require two signatures. One is produced without a fault (r,s), and the other has a fault (rf,sf). From these, we can generate the private key.[1][2]
References
- ↑ Sullivan, G. A., Sippe, J., Heninger, N., & Wustrow, E. (2022). Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of {TLS} keys via transient errors. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22) (pp. 233-250)
- ↑ Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., & Rösler, P. (2018, April). Attacking deterministic signature schemes using fault attacks. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) (pp. 338-352). IEEE.
