Difference between revisions of "Merkle Tree Certificate"
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| − | + | *Quantum-safe**: Compatible with large PQ signatures. | |
| − | + | *Efficient**: Reduces handshake size and complexity. | |
| − | + | *Transparent**: Maintains auditability without external CT logs. | |
| − | + | *Flexible**: Supports both signed and signatureless modes. | |
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==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 17:07, 6 November 2025
Contents
Full Definition
Merkle Tree Certificates are a proposed way to reduce the challenges created by thee Quantum Computing Threat solutions of very large keys and signatures.
Context
Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) are a proposed enhancement to the TLS certificate infrastructure that integrates **public logging directly into the certificate structure**, using Merkle trees to improve efficiency and enable post-quantum readiness.
According to the [IETF Internet-Draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs/):
- MTCs are a new form of **X.509 certificate** that embed **Merkle tree inclusion proofs**. - They aim to **replace or augment Certificate Transparency (CT)** by making the logging of certificates **integrated and verifiable** without relying on external logs. - The design supports **short-lived certificates** and **large post-quantum (PQ) signatures** without bloating TLS handshakes.
Why Are They Needed?
Cloudflare explains that **post-quantum cryptography** introduces **massive key and signature sizes**—up to 20× larger than current ECDSA keys. This creates problems:
- **Performance degradation** in TLS handshakes. - **Increased bandwidth and latency**. - **Scalability issues** for Certificate Transparency logs.
MTCs address this by
- **Reducing the number of signatures** in a certificate chain. - Allowing **signatureless optimizations** for up-to-date clients. - Embedding **Merkle proofs** directly, eliminating the need for separate CT logs.
How It Works
- A **Merkle tree** is constructed from a batch of certificates. - Each certificate includes a **leaf hash** and a **Merkle proof** showing its inclusion in the tree. - Clients verify the certificate’s inclusion in the tree, ensuring **transparency and integrity**. - Optionally, **no signature is needed** if the client already trusts the Merkle root.
Benefits
- Quantum-safe**: Compatible with large PQ signatures.
- Efficient**: Reduces handshake size and complexity.
- Transparent**: Maintains auditability without external CT logs.
- Flexible**: Supports both signed and signatureless modes.
References
- [IETF Draft: draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-08](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs/) - [Cloudflare’s Introduction to MTCs](https://blog.cloudflare.com/bootstrap-mtc/) - [Master’s Thesis on MTC Implementation](https://www.cs.ru.nl/masters-theses/2025/M_Pohl___Implementation_and_Analysis_of_Merkle_Tree_Certificates_for_Post-Quantum_Secure_Authentication_in_TLS.pdf)
Would you like help mapping this to a trust-aware PKI model or visualizing how MTCs compare to traditional CT logs?
Sources: [IETF Draft: Merkle Tree Certificates](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs/) [Cloudflare Blog on MTCs](https://blog.cloudflare.com/bootstrap-mtc/) [Master’s Thesis on MTCs](https://www.cs.ru.nl/masters-theses/2025/M_Pohl___Implementation_and_Analysis_of_Merkle_Tree_Certificates_for_Post-Quantum_Secure_Authentication_in_TLS.pdf)
