Difference between revisions of "Knowledge"
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A significant number of philosophers have convinced themselves that there is no way that a computer could ever be said to have human [[Knowledge]] of any subject. | A significant number of philosophers have convinced themselves that there is no way that a computer could ever be said to have human [[Knowledge]] of any subject. | ||
| − | *Searle: The '''Chinese room argument''' holds that a program is no different from a room full of Chinese scholars who cannot understand English, but can translate English to Chinese using rules in books, and so cannot result in a computer having a "[[mind]]", "[[intentionality|understanding]]" or "[[consciousness]]" regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave.<ref>John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs", (1980) Behavioral and Brain Sciences </ref> Searle argues that, without "understanding" (or "[[intentionality]]"), we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore, he concludes that "strong AI" is false. Most of the discussion consists of attempts to refute it. Searle's argument has become "something of a classic in cognitive science,". Varol Akman agrees, and has described the original paper as "an exemplar of philosophical clarity and purity".<ref>In [[Varol Akman|Akman]]'s [http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=cogprints.org/539/0/md2.ps&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 review of ''Mind Design II'']</ref> But all | + | *Searle: The '''Chinese room argument''' holds that a program is no different from a room full of Chinese scholars who cannot understand English, but can translate English to Chinese using rules in books, and so cannot result in a computer having a "[[mind]]", "[[intentionality|understanding]]" or "[[consciousness]]" regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave.<ref>John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs", (1980) Behavioral and Brain Sciences </ref> Searle argues that, without "understanding" (or "[[intentionality]]"), we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore, he concludes that "strong AI" is false. Most of the discussion consists of attempts to refute it. Searle's argument has become "something of a classic in cognitive science,". Varol Akman agrees, and has described the original paper as "an exemplar of philosophical clarity and purity".<ref>In [[Varol Akman|Akman]]'s [http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=cogprints.org/539/0/md2.ps&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 review of ''Mind Design II'']</ref> But all this discussion boils down to a silly veralism, an argument about the meaning of words, which is why this wiki seeks to define the words that it depends on. In this wiki words mean exactly what we want them to mean, no more and no less. |
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===Strong AI vs. AI research=== | ===Strong AI vs. AI research=== | ||
Searle's arguments are not usually considered an issue for AI research. [[Stuart J. Russell|Stuart Russell]] and [[Peter Norvig]] observe that most AI researchers "don't care about the strong AI hypothesis—as long as the program works, they don't care whether you call it a simulation of intelligence or real intelligence."{{sfn|Russell|Norvig|2003|p=947}} The primary mission of [[artificial intelligence]] research is only to create useful systems that ''act'' intelligently, and it does not matter if the intelligence is "merely" a simulation. | Searle's arguments are not usually considered an issue for AI research. [[Stuart J. Russell|Stuart Russell]] and [[Peter Norvig]] observe that most AI researchers "don't care about the strong AI hypothesis—as long as the program works, they don't care whether you call it a simulation of intelligence or real intelligence."{{sfn|Russell|Norvig|2003|p=947}} The primary mission of [[artificial intelligence]] research is only to create useful systems that ''act'' intelligently, and it does not matter if the intelligence is "merely" a simulation. | ||
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===Turing test=== | ===Turing test=== | ||
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===Robot and semantics replies: finding the meaning=== | ===Robot and semantics replies: finding the meaning=== | ||
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To each of these suggestions, Searle's response is the same: no matter how much knowledge is written into the program and no matter how the program is connected to the world, he is still in the room manipulating symbols according to rules. His actions are [[syntax|syntactic]] and this can never explain to him what the symbols stand for. Searle writes "syntax is insufficient for semantics."{{sfn|Searle|1984}}{{efn|Searle also writes "Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or [[Interpretation (logic)|interpretation]], or semantics) except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them."{{sfn|Motzkin|Searle|1989|p=45}}}} | To each of these suggestions, Searle's response is the same: no matter how much knowledge is written into the program and no matter how the program is connected to the world, he is still in the room manipulating symbols according to rules. His actions are [[syntax|syntactic]] and this can never explain to him what the symbols stand for. Searle writes "syntax is insufficient for semantics."{{sfn|Searle|1984}}{{efn|Searle also writes "Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or [[Interpretation (logic)|interpretation]], or semantics) except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them."{{sfn|Motzkin|Searle|1989|p=45}}}} | ||
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[[Alan Turing]] anticipated Searle's line of argument (which he called "The Argument from Consciousness") in 1950 and makes the other minds reply.{{sfn|Turing|1950|pp=11–12}} He noted that people never consider the problem of other minds when dealing with each other. He writes that "instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks."{{sfn|Turing|1950|p=11}} The [[Turing test]] simply extends this "polite convention" to machines. He doesn't intend to solve the problem of other minds (for machines or people) and he do | [[Alan Turing]] anticipated Searle's line of argument (which he called "The Argument from Consciousness") in 1950 and makes the other minds reply.{{sfn|Turing|1950|pp=11–12}} He noted that people never consider the problem of other minds when dealing with each other. He writes that "instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks."{{sfn|Turing|1950|p=11}} The [[Turing test]] simply extends this "polite convention" to machines. He doesn't intend to solve the problem of other minds (for machines or people) and he do | ||
Revision as of 17:00, 16 August 2018
Contents
Full Title or Meme
Facts, information, and skills acquired by a person through experience and education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.
Context
A significant number of philosophers have convinced themselves that there is no way that a computer could ever be said to have human Knowledge of any subject.
- Searle: The Chinese room argument holds that a program is no different from a room full of Chinese scholars who cannot understand English, but can translate English to Chinese using rules in books, and so cannot result in a computer having a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness" regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave.[1] Searle argues that, without "understanding" (or "intentionality"), we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore, he concludes that "strong AI" is false. Most of the discussion consists of attempts to refute it. Searle's argument has become "something of a classic in cognitive science,". Varol Akman agrees, and has described the original paper as "an exemplar of philosophical clarity and purity".[2] But all this discussion boils down to a silly veralism, an argument about the meaning of words, which is why this wiki seeks to define the words that it depends on. In this wiki words mean exactly what we want them to mean, no more and no less.
Strong AI vs. AI research
Searle's arguments are not usually considered an issue for AI research. Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig observe that most AI researchers "don't care about the strong AI hypothesis—as long as the program works, they don't care whether you call it a simulation of intelligence or real intelligence."{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}} The primary mission of artificial intelligence research is only to create useful systems that act intelligently, and it does not matter if the intelligence is "merely" a simulation.
Turing test
The Chinese room implements a version of the Turing test.{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}} Alan Turing introduced the test in 1950 to help answer the question "can machines think?" In the standard version, a human judge engages in a natural language conversation with a human and a machine designed to generate performance indistinguishable from that of a human being. All participants are separated from one another. If the judge cannot reliably tell the machine from the human, the machine is said to have passed the test.
Turing then considered each possible objection to the proposal "machines can think", and found that there are simple, obvious answers if the question is de-mystified in this way. He did not, however, intend for the test to measure for the presence of "consciousness" or "understanding". He did not believe this was relevant to the issues that he was addressing. He wrote: Template:Quote
To Searle, as a philosopher investigating in the nature of mind and consciousness, these are the relevant mysteries. The Chinese room is designed to show that the Turing test is insufficient to detect the presence of consciousness, even if the room can behave or function as a conscious mind would.
Newell and Simon had conjectured that a physical symbol system (such as a digital computer) had all the necessary machinery for "general intelligent action", or, as it is known today, artificial general intelligence. They framed this as a philosophical position, the physical symbol system hypothesis: "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action."{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}}{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}} The Chinese room argument does not refute this, because it is framed in terms of "intelligent action", i.e. the external behavior of the machine, rather than the presence or absence of understanding, consciousness and mind.
Robot and semantics replies: finding the meaning
To each of these suggestions, Searle's response is the same: no matter how much knowledge is written into the program and no matter how the program is connected to the world, he is still in the room manipulating symbols according to rules. His actions are syntactic and this can never explain to him what the symbols stand for. Searle writes "syntax is insufficient for semantics."{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}}Template:Efn
Alan Turing anticipated Searle's line of argument (which he called "The Argument from Consciousness") in 1950 and makes the other minds reply.{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}} He noted that people never consider the problem of other minds when dealing with each other. He writes that "instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks."{{#invoke:Footnotes|sfn}} The Turing test simply extends this "polite convention" to machines. He doesn't intend to solve the problem of other minds (for machines or people) and he do
Problem
As the process of collecting a User's Identifiers, Attributes etc. (which we can call claims) from a Distributed Identity resident across the cloud in unrelated databases and block-chains, the challenge of turning this data into an Authorization decision becomes quite complex. This is a problem that once was decided by the Knowledge of an expert, for example large bank loans needed to be approved by a vice president and large corporate checks need to be signed by the comptroller of the company.
Solution
The working solution can be viewed as an extension of an existing process in ecommerce where the Relying Party collects the claims about the user and the context of the request (which will likely include user behavior and value of the transaction) into a Trust Vector for processing by a Fraud Detection Service. The result will be used to make the Authorization decision, or it might initiate a continued collection of user claims for a retry.
References
See also Emergent behavior- ↑ John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs", (1980) Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- ↑ In Akman's review of Mind Design II
